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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred by not requiring a 
new trial in this case simply because the trial court instructed 
the jury that any personal-injury judgment awarded plaintiff 
would not be subject to federal income taxation; 
2. whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the 
trial court's decision to disallow expert testimony in the form 
of a legal conclusion; and 
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the 
trial court's admission into evidence of a factual statement 
contained in a demand letter for purposes relating to 
credibility. 
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT OF OPINION 
ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Davidson v. Prince, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (CA, 6/18/91). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
Appellees Erwin M. Prince and Folkens Brothers Trucking 
("Prince") do not dispute the Statement of Jurisdiction of 
appellant Grant Davidson ("Davidson"). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
No error in either of the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect 
in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the 
parties, is grounds for granting a new trial 
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect 
in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
Jn addition, Prince adopts the statement of Determinative 
Rules set forth in Davidson's Petition for Certiorari and the 
addendum thereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For purposes of opposing this petition, Prince does not 
contest Davidson's recitation of the procedural history of this 
action. However, Davidson's Statement of Facts omits certain 
facts necessary to the Court of Appeals' decision, which Prince 
includes herein as follows: 
1. Although the trial court did not allow Davidson's 
expert to express his legal conclusion that Prince was negligent, 
pursuant to questions by Davidson's counsel, the expert did 
present his opinion to the jury as to, inter alia: (i) the 
reason Prince's truck overturned while going around the curve; 
(ii) that the truck was traveling too fast for the curve; (iii) 
what the speed of truck was as it went through the curve; (iv) 
what the speed limit was at the curve; (v) that a person hauling 
livestock should be concerned with his load and what the concern 
shculd be; and (vi) that a person hauling livestock could foresee 
the possibility of injury if the truck overturned. (Partial 
Trial Transcript ["PTT"] at pp. 14-22.) 
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2. One of the theories presented to the jury by Prince's 
counsel was that Davidson was contributorily negligent in causing 
his own injuries because when Davidson saw the steer that had 
been released from Prince!s truck laying beside the railroad 
tracks in an area bounded by a right-of-way fence, Davidson 
approached too closely to the animal, causing the animal to get 
to its feet and chase him. (Supplemental Partial Trial 
Transcript ["SPTT"] at pp. 50-51.) 
3. During depositions and at trial, Davidson had testified 
to a number of different distances from which he first approached 
the steer. He stated variously, for example, that the distance 
was 40 feet, 30 feet, 25 feet, 22 feet and 20 feet. (PTT at pp. 
45-46.) 
4. Davidson had also written a demand letter to Prince's 
insurer stating that the distance from which he had approached 
the steer was actually 10 feet. The trial court allowed Prince's 
counsel to refresh Davidson's recollection, or to impeach 
Davidson's credibility, solely with the 10-foot statement 
contained in the letter. (SPTT at pp. 47-48.) 
5. After the parties had rested, the trial court 
instructed the jury as to damages. The court informed the jury 
that its duty was, inter alia, to determine the amount of damages 
it found "from a preponderance of the evidence would fairly and 
adequately compensate the plaintiff for any injury and loss 
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plaintiff may have sustained as a result of the accident and 
injuries complained of by plaintiff." (R. 221.) 
6. The court also instructed the jury it f,was not 
permitted to award speculative damages, by which term is meant 
compensation for detriment which, although possible, is remote, 
conjectural or speculative." The court then stated in pertinent 
part as follows: 
In determining the amount of the damages, you 
may not include in, or add to an otherwise 
just award any sum for the purpose of 
punishing the defendants, or to serve as an 
example or warning for others. In addition, 
you may not include in your award any sum for 
court costs or attorneys' fees. Neither may 
any sum of money be added to that amount for 
federal income taxes. I charge you as a 
matter of law that the amount award by your 
verdict is exempt from federal income 
taxation. 
(R. 225, 229.) 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST ISSUANCE OF A WRIT 
1. The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Refusing to Remand 
This Case for a New Trial Simply Because the Trial 
Court Instructed the Jury That Any Personal-Injury 
Award Would Not Be Subject to Federal Income Tax. 
Davidson's first argument that certiorari is necessary in 
this case is predicated on the assumption that the jury 
instruction at issue so "tends to mislead the jury" that it is 
grounds for reversible error under Knapstad v. Smith's Management 
Corp. , 774 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1989). See Petition for 
Certiorari at pp. 6-7. In support of this argument, Davidson 
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relies wholly on the Court of Appeals1 express determination that 
1,1
 the effect of [the instruction at issue] on the jury!s ultimate 
damage award is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine.fn Id. citing Davidson v. Prince, Slip Op. filed 
6/18/91, at p. 8. 
Davidson's argument fails, however, simply because contrary 
to Davidson's conclusory assumption, there is absolutely no 
showing that the instruction at issue tended to mislead the jury 
in any respect whatsoever.1 Rather, the jury was properly 
instructed that if Davidson was entitled to recover, it should 
award damages that would "fairly and adequately compensate the 
plaintiff for any injury and loss plaintiff may have sustained as 
a result of the accident and injuries complained of by 
plaintiff." The jury was instructed that it was not permitted to 
award "speculative damages, by which term is meant compensation 
for detriment which, although possible, [was] remote, conjectural 
or speculative." Davidson simply does not and cannot contend 
that he was actually entitled to additional damages based upon 
the mistaken belief that a portion of the verdict would be used 
to pay taxes. 
aThis is not in any way inconsistent with the Court of 
Appeals' determination. Obviously, there is a marked difference 
between an instruction whose effect is difficult or impossible to 
determine, which by its very description does not require the 
expense of a new trial, and an instruction that in fact tends to 
mislead the jury, which may require reversal. 
-5-
Thus, the charge correctly reflected that Davidson was 
entitled to fair compensation for any injuries and losses caused 
by Prince's negligence. The instructions given, read together, 
merely serve to caution the jury to base its award on the 
evidence, not on speculation as to tax consequences, and it 
nowhere appears how the instructions given in this case adversely 
affected Davidson's substantial rights. Under the circumstances, 
the instruction did not in fact tend to mislead the jury, and 
thus did nothing to require reversal of the jury's verdict. 
2. The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Upholding the Trial 
Court Exclusion of a Legal Conclusion by Plaintiff's 
Expert. 
Davidson also argues that certiorari is necessary here 
because the Court of Appeals' decision will somehow "drastically 
alter the use of expert testimony in personal injury actions or 
other cases involving negligence or other legally cognizable 
breaches of duty." See Petition for Certiorari at p. 10. 
Davidson states in support of this argument that the world is 
increasingly complex and the testimony of his expert involved 
elements of physics and other sciences which "can be extremely 
difficult for a lay person to grasp." id. 
There is no reason for certiorari here, however, because 
again there is no showing to support Davidson's conclusory 
assertions. First, the exclusion of a legal conclusion under the 
circurstances of this case in no way alters the common law of 
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this state or restricts the use of proper expert testimony. In 
fact, as the Court of Appeals notes, Davidson's expert was 
allowed to give his opinion as to, inter alia, the reason 
Prince!s truck overturned while going around the curve, that the 
truck was traveling too fast for the curve, what the speed of 
truck was as it went through the curve, what the speed limit was 
at the curve, that a person hauling livestock should be concerned 
with his load and what the concern should be, and that a person 
hauling livestock could foresee the possibility of injury if the 
truck overturned. All the expert was not allowed to do was give 
a legal conclusion. 
Under such circumstances, the exclusion does not alter Utah 
law in the slightest. fll[W]hile [Rule 704] permits expert 
opinion testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule 704 does not mean 
that all opinions are admissible into evidence. Rules 701 and 
702 require, respectively, that the opinions . . . assist the 
trier of fact. And Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of 
evidence which wastes time. Thus, if a witness's opinion will do 
little more that tell the jury what result to reach, it will be 
inadmissible.'" Davidson v. Prince, 163 Adv. Rep. at 63 n. 6 
citing J. Moore Moore's Federal Practice § 704.02 (1989). 
With regard to the bald assertion that the testimony 
presented was difficult for a lay person to grasp, the Court of 
Appeals expressly noted that: 
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Indeed, the only evidence the trial court 
excluded was [the expert's] conclusion 
regarding whether appellee was negligent. 
Additionally, [the expert's] testimony was 
not technical or difficult to understand, but 
was expressed in lay terms. The trial judge 
did not err in excluding Mr. Knight's opinion 
testimony that the appellee was negligent. 
See Davidson v. Prince, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 58, 61 (CA, 6/18/91). 
Not surprisingly, Davidson cites no portions of the record to 
dispute this statement. In fact, the opinion testimony was 
presented in terms that were very easy to understand pursuant to 
questions from Davidson's own counsel. 
3. The Court of Appeals Did Not Err in Upholding the Trial 
Court's Admission into Evidence of a Factual Statement 
in a Demand Letter For Purposes Relating to 
Credibility. 
Finally, Davidson argues that certiorari is necessary 
because he disagrees with the Court of Appeals' determination 
that a factual statement admitted into evidence was not part of 
any offer to compromise his claim so as to be barred by Rule 408 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Petition for Certiorari at p. 
11-14. Davidson's argument fails, however, because the Court of 
Appeals correctly determined that the letter at issue did not 
contain any offer to compromise which might be construed as an 
admission by the fact finder. Even if it did, it was offered for 
purposes relating credibility and was thus not barred by Rule 
408. 
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For example, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the 
policy underlying Rule 408 is grounded on the recognition that 
willingness to compromise a claim for less than all that is due 
might be construed as an admission of weakness, and settlement 
overtures might be adversely affected if compromise efforts that 
failed were subsequently admissible at trial. See Davidson v. 
Prince, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 62, citing 10 J. Moore, Moore's 
Federal Practice § 408.04 (1988 & Supp. 1990). An offer or 
willingness to compromise, which in turn could be construed as an 
admission, is the sine qua non of any communication protected 
bnth by the rule and the policy underlying the rule. Icl. 
Davidson points to the last sentence of the letter as that 
portion of the communication fulfilling this requirement. The 
last sentence reads: "You may speak with us directly or we can 
send it to lawyers and to court, you decide." Davidson 
completely fails to show, however, how this statement offers to 
compromise Davidson's claim for less than all that is due. In 
fact, the sentence simply offers alternatives between voluntarily 
paying every bit of Davidson's claim by direct communication with 
Davidson himself, or being forced to pay by "lawyers" and "court, 
you decide." There is simply no compromise of Davidson's claim 
offered in the letter, and neither the letter or statements 
contained therein are protected by Rule 408. 
Even if the letter or the statement contained therein were 
within the purview of Rule 408, however, which they are not, 
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Prince's counsel did not offer the 10-foot statement contained in 
the demand letter "to establish liability or invalidity of a 
claim" as prohibited by the rule. Rather, Prince's counsel 
offered the 10-foot statement to impeach Davidson's testimony as 
to the distance from which he first approached the steer. The 
trial court allowed the 10-foot statement into evidence solely 
for that purpose. Accordingly, Rule 408 does not prohibit the 
evidence in any event. 
For example, in United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. 
Olympia Wings, Inc., 896 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1990), the court held 
that the trial court properly acted within its discretion under 
Rule 408 when it admitted evidence of a settlement to impeach the 
plaintiff's earlier deposition testimony. The court stated as 
follows: 
We are persuaded that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting 
evidence of settlement to show the change in 
[plaintiff's] position since his deposition 
was taken. Fed. R. Evid. 408 permits 
settlement evidence for any purpose except to 
prove or disprove liability or the amount of 
claim. The district court has broad 
discretion in determining whether to admit 
evidence of settlement for another purpose 
and we will not disturb that decision 
lightly. 
896 F.2d at 956. 
This Court has also indicated, in dicta, that this same 
exception obtains under Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989), the Court stated 
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that "[t]aken together, the two statutes resulted in a rule not 
unlike Utah Rule of Evidence 408, now in effect. In other words, 
they precluded introduction of the settlement for purposes of 
establishing liability but not for purposes relating to 
credibility." Id. at 443 (emphasis added); see also Id. n. 12 
(where the Court stated that if Rule 408 applied to the trial in 
Slusher, "it even more clearly supports the conclusion we reach 
[that evidence of compromise should be allowed for impeachment 
purposes]."). 
CONCLUSION 
Prince respectfully submits that for the reasons stated 
above the decision of the Court of Appeals was in no way 
erroneous, and does not require additional appellate review by 
this Court after an already lengthy appellate review process. 
Prince requests that the Petition for Certiorari be denied. 
DATED this day of August, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
H. James Clegg 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Erwin M. Prince and Folkens 
Brothers Trucking 
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